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It is with pleasure that I present this fourth and final publi-
cation in CEDA’s Australia’s Energy Options series – Policy 
choice not economic inevitability.
As a major source of commodities, including significant known 
reserves of low carbon emission energy sources, Australia is 
well positioned to supply the world’s future energy needs. 
However, in order for that to occur, Australia needs to examine all its energy 
options, a point CEDA has made through this research series and thought leader-
ship programs around Australia. 
CEDA’s Australia’s Energy Options series commenced in late 2011. It has included 
three policy perspectives that have covered nuclear energy, renewables and effi-
ciency, and unconventional energy options, and this final report.
This final report provides key recommendations drawn from each policy perspec-
tive but also looks at the Australian electricity market and opportunities to improve 
its efficiency and effectiveness.
New recommendations in this report include:
That state governments divest their ownership of network service provision •	
sight arrangements to take account of state-ownership;
Steps be taken to speed up the roll-out of smart meters and also time-of-use •	
pricing to allow better consumer control of electricity use;
An education campaign be undertaken to better educate consumers about •	
their energy use and the real cost of electricity, such as during peak demand 
periods; and
Concession provisions be reviewed to ensure all households in hardship can be •	
appropriately identified.
CEDA has undertaken this series over the past 12 months because the combina-
tion of these issues has the potential to not only set-up Australia with low-cost 
efficient energy supplies for all Australian consumers but also open up significant 
export opportunities potentially delivering substantial gains to our economy.
Foreword
assets, or if this does not happen, at the very least, change regulatory over-
A u s t r A l i A ’ s  E n E r g y  O p t i O n s :  p O l i c y  c h O i c E  n O t  E c O n O m i c  i n E v i t A b i l i t y 
4
A u s t r A l i A ’ s  E n E r g y  O p t i O n s :  p O l i c y  c h O i c E  n O t  E c O n O m i c  i n E v i t A b i l i t y 
5
In addition, it is no coincidence that CEDA’s work has also coincided with the 
Federal Government’s work on its Energy White paper, because we saw this as 
the perfect time to provide policy-makers with evidence-based research.
Pleasingly there has been some good discussion and debate of the issues 
covered in this series in the lead-up to the Federal Government’s Energy White 
Paper. However, the elephant in the room remains nuclear.
CEDA still maintains that governments must review their opposition to nuclear 
energy and ensure this option forms part of any strategy for Australia’s future 
energy options.
This is important because nuclear could be a significant contributor to Australia’s 
long term energy needs delivering low cost baseload power while also helping to 
mitigate the effects of climate change.
As first steps towards enabling nuclear power deployment government should 
establish a national regulatory regime to oversee and monitor any potential deploy-
ment of nuclear power and also begin training nuclear engineers by establishing 
the equivalent of the previous School for Nuclear Engineering or the Australian 
School of Nuclear Technology.
Thank you to all the contributing authors during this series and also our sponsors, 
Rio Tinto and ElectraNet. 
I hope this series has been informative and will continue to drive rigorous analysis 
and discussion on this important topic.
Professor the Hon. Stephen Martin 
Chief Executive 
CEDA
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It is very important to arriving at credible and appropriate 
public policy, that institutions such as CEDA are encour-
aged and supported to independently undertake analysis 
and actively challenge the prevailing orthodoxy on matters 
of public policy.
Good policy only occurs because a broad review of all aspects 
of a question is put under the microscope. In its Energy 
Options series, CEDA has canvassed a great many of the existing paradigms and 
introduced a large number of thought leaders through the series.
ElectraNet has been proud, as an energy industry participant, to have supported 
CEDA’s work to enable these questions to be debated. We may not always agree 
with the conclusions reached, but frankly that is not the point. Not all points of 
view receive equal weighting in resolving conundrums. However, processes that 
encourage all parties to share their points of view and perspectives make for a 
more pluralist and inclusive society.
Essentially, we are all working to achieve the same outcome which is soundly 
encapsulated in the first sentence of this report:
“A reliable and affordable supply of energy is a fundamental component to a 
vibrant economy.”
If ElectraNet support has in any way helped to foster that better outcome, we are 
both proud and privileged to have been part of it.
Ian Stirling 
Chief Executive Officer 
ElectraNet
Foreword…cont
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Energy is the lifeblood of modern society. It literally powers 
our economy, providing the driving force for transport and 
heavy industry, giving life to the bits and bytes of informa-
tion technology, and enabling the quality of life that we 
currently enjoy.
Reliable energy is something that we take for granted. 
Moreover, it is considered an essential service. In Australia 
and other developed countries we expect, almost without exception, to have suf-
ficient electricity to meet all our requirements at every instant in time. And this 
expectation is almost always met. However, this is not the case in much of the 
world. Many in Australia would be surprised to learn that today over 1.3 billion 
people have no access to electricity. 
We are fortunate in Australia to have abundant indigenous energy resources and 
a well-developed energy system. However, significant challenges have emerged. 
Electricity prices have risen very significantly over the past several years causing 
hardship for many households and businesses. Over a relatively short timeframe 
energy costs in Australia have stopped being a source of competitive advantage. 
Also a credible pathway to sustainably reducing greenhouse gas emissions is yet 
to emerge. 
Finding solutions to these challenges will require a long term perspective, which 
is often incongruous with the reality of the day to day political contest faced by 
governments. It is in this context that rigorous and independent contributions to 
the public policy debate are so important. Rio Tinto is proud to support this series 
of reports facilitated by CEDA. 
David Peever  
Managing Director 
Rio Tinto Australia
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A reliable and affordable supply of energy is a fundamental component to 
a vibrant economy. As a major source of commodities, including significant 
known reserves of low carbon emission energy sources, Australia is well posi-
tioned to supply the world’s future energy needs. In order for that to occur, 
Australia needs to examine all its energy options. 
The Government released a Draft Energy White paper in November 2011. CEDA 
considers this an opportunity that the Government should not miss in ensur-
ing that Australia not only develops its energy resources for national economic 
gain but also to guarantee access to reasonably priced energy for Australian 
consumers.
CEDA determined it would contribute to this significant debate by undertaking a 
year-long research project that examined Australia’s future energy options.
As part of this research project CEDA published three policy perspectives that 
addressed Australia’s nuclear, renewables and efficiency and unconventional 
energy options. Recommendations in each of these perspectives were made with 
the specific aim of providing policy-makers with evidence-based research on the 
various energy sources either currently available or being actively explored and 
researched, often funded through the public purse. Fundamental governance 
decisions underpinned by strong economic policy arguments were at the centre 
of these recommendations.
This final research report canvasses one of the more significant current debates 
associated with the availability of energy – the Australian electricity market. It puts 
forward a series of recommendations designed to enhance this element of the 
energy sector’s efficiency, security and effectiveness by placing consumers at the 
centre of the energy market and a reform agenda is proposed. 
Executive summary
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Australia’s Nuclear Options
Recommendation 1
As a significant potential contributor to solving Australia’s long-term energy needs, 
mitigating negative climate change effects, and ensuring the economic benefits 
associated with uranium mining and the potential to develop an international 
nuclear waste storage industry, Governments should review their opposition to 
nuclear energy and uranium mining and ensure this option forms part of any strat-
egy for Australia’s future energy options.
Recommendation 2
To enable nuclear power deployment:
Establish a national regulatory regime to oversee and monitor any potential •	
deployment of nuclear power; and
Train nuclear engineers by establishing the equivalent of the previous School for •	
Nuclear Engineering or the Australian School of Nuclear Technology.
Australia’s Energy Options: Renewables  
and efficiency
Recommendation 1
In order to achieve long term socially sustainable renewables policy:
Quantify the value of renewable energy sources for mitigating carbon emis-•	
sions over the long term so that monies expended on them match their social 
value; and
Replace ad hoc decision making with a rigorous methodology that accounts for •	
the risks and quantifies the assumptions, influencing policy intervention.
Overall series 
recommendations
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Recommendation 2
To maximise the nation’s social benefit from low carbon emissions technology 
development:
Introduce a market that incentivises energy efficiency. This would potentially •	
buy a considerable period of time without further energy generation capacity 
needing to be deployed, allowing more time for renewable technological inno-
vation to occur prior to deployment.
Australia’s Unconventional Energy Options
Recommendation 1
Government and industry undertake specific actions to ensure a social licence to 
operate underpins energy extraction activity. This should include:
Establishing a framework for land access negotiations to facilitate collabora-•	
tion between industry and other users of land. As unconventional gas reserves 
are located onshore, state governments are responsible for simplifying the 
process surrounding access arrangement negotiations. However, the Federal 
Government should ensure there are consistent requirements across the differ-
ent jurisdictions;
Establishing clear and well-resourced processes for community consultation •	
based on OECD guidelines that include providing timely, reliable, easy to find 
and understandable information to the community. In addition, an independent 
and public process for evaluating the success or failure of community engage-
ment programs should be implemented and shortfalls identified through this 
process addressed; and
Adoption of better and best practice management by industry that includes •	
careful monitoring of wellbores and their integrity, water, air quality and noise 
levels associated with mining activity.
Recommendation 2
To ensure that water policy successfully incorporates the full impact of unconven-
tional energy extraction:
Government must mandate through legislation that unconventional energy •	
water use be integrated into regular water allocation frameworks;
Industry be required by government to develop an integrated risk management •	
framework that applies temporary precautionary measures that are progres-
sively relaxed, if appropriate, as more information becomes available about 
potential impacts from unconventional energy activity; and
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A timeframe that is long enough to incorporate all the consequences of uncon-•	
ventional gas extraction be adopted for water policy management. This should 
be over the lifecycle of the mining activity, up to three or four decades, rather 
than the shorter timeframes traditionally employed in water management.
Reforming network service provision
Recommendation 1
State governments divest their ownership of network service provision assets. 
If state governments do not privatise the provision of network services, then the 
following should be undertaken: 
The ownership structure of network service providers is considered when •	
determining a suitable return on the regulated asset base; 
The timeframe over which regulatory price or revenue controls are imposed •	
should be reassessed; 
The use of benchmarking for prices, expenditures, asset values, service •	
outcomes and rates of return should be expanded to best domestic and com-
parable standards; and
The regulatory oversight arrangements for jurisdictions where state govern-•	
ments maintain ownership should be examined.
Australian Electricity Market
Recommendation 1
The regulatory framework for electricity metering should be amended to intro-•	
duce competition for metering services. Such an outcome would promote 
faster adoption of new smart metering technology;
Immediately deregulate electricity prices and allow for time-of-use pricing at •	
both the network and retail level (this pricing already effectively exists at the 
wholesale level through the operation of the NEM); and
Governments and industry should develop a comprehensive education cam-•	
paign for electricity consumers aimed at providing information about why 
electricity prices are rising and why reducing peak demand is in every cus-
tomer’s interests.
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Recommendation 2
That a mechanism for consumers to effectively participate in electricity markets •	
via negotiated settlements be explored. 
Recommendation 3
The enabling regulatory and technological changes to facilitate an energy ser-•	
vices model should be examined. 
Recommendation 4
There needs to be a comprehensive national review of concessions frameworks •	
with a view to better aligning concessions and transfer payments with customers 
in need (for example payments based on household income and consumption 
rather than one or the other).
Recommendation 5
That any new additional support for low carbon technologies should be based •	
on the value of the call option they represent for Australia. Essentially, this rep-
resents a shift in new policies from encouraging deployment to encouraging the 
potential for deployment.
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This chapter examines issues associated with the Australian 
electricity market and provides recommendations to enhance 
the sector’s efficiency, security and effectiveness.
Australian electricity market: 
Policy choice not economic 
inevitability
Paul Simshauser, Tim Nelson 
and Nathan Taylor 
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policy and sustainability, energy regulation, government affairs, media and 
corporate communications, and emerging technology. 
Paul has over 20 years experience in the energy industry having started his 
career with the Queensland Electricity Commission. He previously held senior executive positions at 
Stanwell, NewGen Power and Babcock & Brown. He holds Bachelor Degrees in Economics and in 
Commerce, a Masters Degree in Accounting and Finance, and a PhD in Economics from the 
University of Queensland. He is an FCPA, an AFMA Accredited Dealer and a Fellow of the Australian 
Institute of Company Directors.
Paul is Professor of Economics at Griffith University’s Business School, and is widely published on 
energy economics in academic journals. Paul is also a member of the Australian Bureau of Resource 
and Energy Economics Advisory Board and a member of CEDA’s Council on Economic Policy.
Tim Nelson is the Head of Economics, Policy and Sustainability at AGL Energy. 
In this role, Tim is responsible for: AGL’s sustainability strategy; greenhouse 
accounting and reporting; AGL’s energy and greenhouse research; AGL’s 
corporate citizenship program, Energy for Life; and energy and greenhouse 
policy. 
Tim is also an Adjunct Research Fellow at the University of New England and has had several papers 
published in Australian and international peer-reviewed journals. He has presented at conferences in 
Australia and throughout Asia and Europe.
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is responsible for the CEDA Research and Policy agenda which is undertaking 
an extensive series of reports into water, energy and population issues in 2012. 
He has been responsible for the projects Crisis and Opportunity: Lessons from 
Australian Water Reform and A Greater Australia: Population, policies and 
governance. He has also edited Australia’s Nuclear Options, Renewables and efficiency and 
Australia’s Unconventional Energy Options. He has authored the paper Water Security: Water for the 
farm and the city. Nathan has held policy roles at the Reserve Bank of Australia, the Chamber of 
Commerce and Industry WA, WALGA and others. He is the author of a book on corporate 
governance and cultural change and the blog The Writings of a Naked Ape.
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Introduction
A reliable and affordable supply of energy is a fundamental component to a 
vibrant economy. As a major source of commodities, including significant known 
reserves of low carbon emission energy sources, Australia is well positioned to 
supply the world’s future energy needs. In order for that to occur, Australia needs 
to examine all its energy options.
CEDA was founded to encourage good policy and influence public and private 
opinion by providing a platform for worthy ideas to be shared and heard. For 
this reason, CEDA commissioned 15 contributions from leading individuals and 
organisations with expertise in energy matters and exposed their thoughts to a 
broad audience of business and government decision makers via three policy 
perspectives. 
The three policy perspectives discussed a broad suite of policy and energy 
options available to Australia to ensure future energy security and reliability in 
a carbon-constrained environment. Issues examined included the potential 
opportunities and challenges associated with nuclear power (Australia’s Nuclear 
Options, November 2011), renewable energy and efficiency (Australia’s Energy 
Options: Renewables and efficiency, May 2012) and unconventional energy such 
as coal seam gas (Australia’s Unconventional Energy Options, September 2012). 
A brief overview of these perspectives is contained in Appendix 2.
This final research report is a consequence of the publication of these, together 
with consideration of views expressed at CEDA thought leadership forums on the 
importance of good policy to guide government decision-making with respect to 
Australia’s energy options. 
In addition to drawing together the recommendations from the previous three 
reports, it also examines the issues associated with the Australian electricity 
market. It puts forward a series of recommendations designed to enhance this 
element of the energy sector’s efficiency, security and effectiveness by placing 
consumers at the centre of the energy market and proposes a reform agenda.
Energy prices: Inevitability or policy choice? 
In the 1990s, Australia embarked upon a journey of significant microeconomic 
reform. The wholesale electricity market was created through the establishment 
of the National Electricity Market (NEM) and significant gains, measured as a 
reduction in electricity prices, were achieved. In 2002, the Council of Australian 
Governments Energy Market Review estimated that over five years, reforms 
would increase Gross Domestic Product (GDP) by approximately $7 billion.1 
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While the reform agenda that created the NEM produced stable energy prices for 
over a decade, since 2007 electricity prices began to escalate. 
To usher in a new phase of stable, or even declining energy prices, will require 
a reform agenda focused on the critical challenges of the energy sector. This 
includes: 
Effectively addressing peak demand growth;•	
Targeting hardship payments for consumers; •	
Engaging and empowering consumers; and•	
Establishing robust policy in a greenhouse gas constrained environment. •	
The reform agenda outlined in this report places the consumer front and centre 
in the energy market. It is telling that the current annual Statement of Opportunity 
released by the Australian Energy Market Operator (AEMO), which is meant to 
cover all energy issues for the sector, stops at the meter box of the consumer. 
This is a powerful example for how some parts of the sector views consumers and 
it is important to ensure they can be brought into the decision making process. 
Figure 1 
REAl AND NomiNAl ENERgy PRiCES 
Source: Dynamic Pricing and the Peak Electricity Load Problem, Paul Simshauser and David Downer, The Australian Economic Review, Vol 
45, No 3, pp 1–20 
NSW Residential Tariff (Nominal, LHS Axis)
QLD Residential Tariff (Nominal, LHS Axis)
NSW Residential Tariff (2008$, RHS Axis)
QLD Residential Tariff (2008$, RHS Axis)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
Average Residential Tariff (Nominal $/MWh) Average Residential Tariff (Real 2008 $/MWh)
0
50
100
150
200
250
300
350
400
20
15
20
13
20
11
20
09
20
07
20
05
20
03
20
01
19
99
19
97
19
95
19
93
19
91
19
89
19
87
19
85
19
83
19
81
19
79
19
77
19
75
19
73
19
71
19
69
19
67
19
65
19
63
19
61
19
59
19
57
19
55
A u s t r A l i A ’ s  E n E r g y  O p t i O n s :  p O l i c y  c h O i c E  n O t  E c O n O m i c  i n E v i t A b i l i t y 
16
A u s t r A l i A ’ s  E n E r g y  O p t i O n s :  p O l i c y  c h O i c E  n O t  E c O n O m i c  i n E v i t A b i l i t y 
17
Addressing the peak
As electricity cannot be economically stored there is no inventory from which to 
draw upon during peak periods. Consequently, network infrastructure and elec-
tricity generation capacity must expand to meet projected instantaneous peak 
demand (plus a margin for forecast errors and plant outages). The capital cost 
of doing so is significant given the high fixed cost nature of electricity generation 
and network infrastructure. In fact, more than $900 million of capital has been 
invested in the distribution network in south-east Queensland and is used for just 
3.5 days per annum, albeit not continuous days (Smart State Council 2010). To 
put this into context, the total capital stock of the south-east Queensland grid is 
$8 billion and therefore 12.5 per cent of the network is provided for use on 3.5 
days per annum. 
To calculate how underutilised the capital stock is likely to be, it is necessary 
to consider the “load factor”. When aggregate electricity demand is measured 
as a continuous half-hourly “load” throughout the year, the load factor can be 
determined as the ratio between maximum and average demand. A virtually flat 
consumption curve, such as that typically associated with an aluminium smelter, 
has a load factor close to unity (100 per cent capital utilisation). Conversely, highly 
“peaky” household loads typically have a load factor of 0.30–0.40 in aggregate 
(30-40 per cent capital utilisation). Higher load factors result in greater capital 
utilisation with fixed costs spread over larger volumes of energy. This results in 
lower unit pricing. The opposite is true for lower load factors. As an example, 
South Australia’s aggregate load factor is one of the worst in the Organisation 
for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), at just 0.42 (ESAA 2011). 
Capital utilisation rates for NSW and Queensland are provided in Table 1.
Table 1 
UTiliSATioN RATES foR CAPiTAl iN NSW AND QUEENSlAND
NSW Total 
Demand
NSW 
Residential 
Demand 
QLD Total  
Demand
QLD 
Residential 
Demand
Maximum Demand (MW) 13,812 4721 8413 2386 
Energy Demand (GWh) 78,289 16,869 52,183 8791
Utilisation Rate (%) 64.7 40.8 70.8 42.1
Poor capital utilisation rates are economically inefficient in most circumstances. 
Given the essential role electricity plays in producing other goods and services, it 
is critical that consideration be given to further pricing reform to drive macroeco-
nomic objectives. Table 1 shows that the utilisation rate of households (around 
40 per cent) is far lower than the average economy (between 65 per cent and 70 
per cent). This is indicative of the greater uptake of spatial heating and cooling 
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devices which are only operated by households for very short periods of time 
over the course of a year. Current flat pricing of electricity results in businesses 
(producing goods and services and creating wealth and employment) effectively 
cross subsidising households. While providing an estimate of the reduction in eco-
nomic activity associated with the cross subsidisation inherent in current pricing 
structures is beyond the scope of this paper, we note that the effective cross 
subsidisation is likely to become more pronounced as utilisation rates deteriorate 
even further.
Capital utilisation rates have declined materially over the past decade. Since 
2004, peak demand in NEM jurisdictions has grown by 18 per cent while underly-
ing energy demand has increased by only nine per cent. Unfortunately, the latest 
AEMO electricity demand projections show capital utilisation rates declining in at 
least two of the NEM regions. In previous eras, it was difficult to envisage pricing 
reforms that would arrest this decline in utilisation rates. However, demand-side 
participation now represents an important frontier for policy-makers because by 
shifting from mechanical to digital metering, is now possible and economical.
By shifting from mechanical to digital meters (and removing retail pricing regu-
lation), the industry would be better placed to price electricity as a function of 
time (time-of-use or ToU pricing). Such an outcome would overcome the fun-
damental barrier to improvements in the utilisation of the existing (and potential 
future) capital stock – pricing and incentives. Unless pricing at the time of peak 
demand reflects the costs of underutilised capacity, electricity users will not have 
any incentive to reduce their consumption. In fact, alternative pricing methods 
(such as inclining block tariffs) which have been used in the past, are counter-
productive. This is because when faced with higher prices for greater levels of 
overall energy consumption, energy users will restrain consumption at the time 
most convenient for them – non-peak demand times – effectively worsening the 
capital utilisation rate and increasing underlying prices. Only ToU pricing provides 
incentives for electricity consumers to reduce consumption at the time of relative 
scarcity – the time period where peak demand occurs.
But before policy makers proceed with dynamic pricing, not all dynamic pricing 
responses can be considered equal. However, we are fortunate that there is a 
rich history of pricing trials to learn from. The quintessential applied economic 
analysis of dynamic pricing and its effectiveness is contained in Faruqui (2010)2, 
where 70 pricing pilots from North America, Europe and Australia were analysed 
for their reduction in peak demand. We have reproduced the results from Faruqui 
(2010) in Figure 2.
The pricing pilots documented in Figure 2 reveal that the mere shift from average 
to time-of-use tariffs reduces peak demand by 4.7 per cent on average. Where 
technology is added to households to provide for an automated demand 
response (i.e. the household does not need to sit at home waiting for electricity 
prices to spike in order to turn devices off), reductions averaged 17.8 per cent 
and spanned a range of two–32 per cent. Technologies that became economic 
due to the change in pricing included cycling switchers and programmable com-
municating thermostats which enable appliances, such as air-conditioning units, 
to be throttled back, “kill switches” which turn off all appliances on stand-by 
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Figure 2 
DyNAmiC PRiCiNg TRiAlS AND REDUCTioNS iN PEAk DEmAND
Source: Dynamic Pricing and the Peak Electricity Load Problem, Paul Simshauser and David Downer, The Australian Economic Review, Vol 
45, No 3, pp 1-20 
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mode, smart whitegoods which schedule their load by time and in-home displays. 
An alternative method of pricing, grouped together as peak-time rebate trials, 
involved consumers being rewarded for reducing demand below their average 
levels and in turn receiving a rebate on their bills. In these trials, peak demand 
was reduced by an average of 13.6 per cent and spanned a range of five–23 per 
cent. Where technology was added to automate demand response, the average 
reduction was 22.1 per cent. 
Overall, Figure 2 shows that critical peak pricing pilots have averaged a 20.7 
per cent reduction in peak demand at the household level, with results spanning 
10–50 per cent. Technology driven demand response led to a surprisingly large 
34.1 per cent reduction in peak demand. Such evidence provides a compelling 
reason for policy makers to urgently consider rolling out smart meters and dereg-
ulating retail electricity pricing to facilitate significant improvements in the capital 
utilisation rate of Australian electricity infrastructure. Such an outcome would not 
only improve economic productivity, it would correct a significant issue of equity 
in relation to current cross subsidies. Businesses and low-income households 
without access to air conditioning are effectively cross subsidising households 
with air conditioning. If introduced carefully, dynamic pricing would improve both 
economic efficiency and equity.
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While the introduction of dynamic pricing is likely to provide overarching improve-
ments in economic efficiency and equity, there are likely to be a small number 
of vulnerable consumers who struggle to pay peak rates for electricity. In broad 
terms, this band of consumers is likely to fit in one of two key segments of low-
income consumers. The first group is peaky households that are high users of 
energy because of unemployment, disability or caring for young children or elderly 
relatives. The other group is peaky households with inelastic electricity use; that 
is, those unable to shift their usage due to the inability of appliances to be pro-
grammed to run in off-peaks. Policy makers will need to consider additional policy 
measures such as greater concessions for vulnerable consumers or exclusion 
from the program in the case of households using vital medical equipment. 
Recommendation 1
Amend the regulatory framework for electricity metering to introduce competi-•	
tion for metering services. Such an outcome would promote faster adoption of 
new smart metering technology;
Deregulate electricity prices immediately and allow for ToU pricing at both the •	
network and retail level (this pricing already effectively exists at the wholesale 
level through the operation of the NEM); and
Governments and industry should develop a comprehensive education cam-•	
paign for electricity consumers aimed at providing information about why 
electricity prices are rising and why reducing peak demand is in every cus-
tomer’s interests.
Engaging consumers
It is telling that the energy industry’s annual Electricity Statement of Opportunities 
explicitly stops at the meter box. Yet the greatest opportunities in reforming the 
energy sector will come from engaging and empowering consumers. With the 
rapid advances occurring in information technology it is not difficult to imagine 
a future where households can utilise smart devices to exert control over their 
energy use. 
When the energy sector was deregulated the intent was to introduce competi-
tion to protect the interests of consumers wherever possible. Where competition 
has been successfully introduced, particularly in the generation and retail areas, 
the experience has been broadly positive. However, regulation of the network 
service providers has been far from the light-handed approach initially envisaged. 
Instead: 
“ Economic regulatory processes in the NEM have become bureaucratic, 
inflexible, drawn-out, politicised, opaque, adversarial and heavily lobbied.”3 
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Proposals from NSPs frequently run to thousands of pages in length, accom-
panied by many technical reports. There are many bi-lateral discussions and 
information exchanges between the regulator and network service providers. 
Regulatory decisions can take several years to complete, and can be contested 
by organisations with strong financial interests in the outcomes. It has been rec-
ognised that there are clear information asymmetries between the regulators and 
NSPs.4 While there is scope for consumer involvement in the decision making 
process, the asymmetric relationship is substantially worse. 
An alternative approach that is potentially quicker, less expensive and less adver-
sarial is to introduce negotiated settlements into determining energy service 
characteristics. This process has successfully been used in North America to allow 
consumers and their representatives to settle the prices charged by monopoly 
providers through negotiation. The regulator’s role is to facilitate negotiation and 
to act as the decision-maker of last resort where negotiated settlements cannot 
be reached. 
The outcomes of negotiated settlements in the United States was summarised 
by Professor Littlechild, arguably the architect behind the regulatory framework 
adopted in Australia, as: 
“ The proof of the pudding is in the eating. The parties involved have increas-
ingly preferred settlement to litigation over the course of the last half-century. 
This is a remarkable record of survival in an activity – utility regulation – that 
has been characterised by little or no reform and change over this period ... 
Traditional litigation has become essentially a method of dispute resolution 
limited to novel or exceptionally difficult rate case issues.”5
Empowering consumers is an important part of ensuring enduring improvements 
in the energy sector. This means creating a mechanism for consumers to effec-
tively participate in electricity markets. Effective involvement of consumers in the 
regulation of networks can also promote better understanding that more accu-
rately reflects the views of the parties and allows more creative solutions than 
regulatory commissions are capable of delivering.
Negotiated settlements can take a number of forms and be extended into many 
areas of regulation. To introduce a more dynamic role for consumers in determin-
ing the quality of the service provided the potential role of negotiated settlements 
should be examined, particularly with regard to the role and characteristics of the 
network service providers. 
Recommendation 2
That a mechanism for consumers to effectively participate in electricity markets •	
via negotiated settlements be explored. 
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Energy services model
The relatively low cost of energy for most consumers (for example, about 2.6 per 
cent of household expenditure) means that energy efficiency is not the dominate 
concern in most purchases. This applies to the retail sector but also to most 
goods in the wholesale sector, unless energy is a major input into the cost struc-
ture of a business. Energy efficiency improvements are, generally speaking, a by 
product of innovation rather than its driving force. A proposal that would signifi-
cantly restructure incentives would be to introduce an energy services model. 
To appreciate how the energy services model could drive innovation, consider the 
market for mobile phones. 
“Free or heavily discounted equipment (phones) are currently provided under 
varying contracts according to need, usage and desire to hedge against risk. 
In the case of an energy service approach, a consumer would buy an energy 
service, much in the same way they subscribe to a high use mobile phone 
service.”6 
Such a model could enable competition in the energy sector from non-traditional 
sources, such as the retailers of white goods. However, the key advantage of an 
energy services model would be that it could create the same economies of scale 
and scope to energy services as exists for energy generation. These incentives 
currently exist, but are dulled and disbursed. An example of the consequence is 
that consumers frequently purchase air conditioners that may cost them $1500 
but that impose costs on the energy system of $7000 when their contribution to 
the peak is factored in. 
An energy services model would involve a return to how energy was initially 
sold. The industry pioneer Thomas Edison initially offered light and heating as a 
service on Manhattan Island. Creating a market that involves selling energy ser-
vices rather than just selling kilowatt hours would realign the incentive structures 
of service providers so that they are encouraged to provide efficient solutions to 
consumers. 
Recommendation 3
The enabling regulatory and technological changes to facilitate an energy ser-•	
vices model should be examined. 
However, the capacity to quantify the benefits of energy efficiency would be 
dependent on fully cost reflective pricing that is based on energy ToU. These 
reforms should be addressed first. 
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Equity in energy – rethinking customer hardship 
and concessions frameworks
Electricity prices have increased significantly in recent years. However, it is 
likely that the “rate of change” that has been of most concern to consumers, 
not necessarily the absolute price level. Figure 3 shows the Consumer Price 
Index (CPI) and the electricity price index for the period from 1985 to 2012. With 
the exception of three single year periods, between 1985 and 2007 electricity 
prices declined in real terms as general inflation was greater than the electricity 
price index. However, since 2007 there has been a significant run-up in electric-
ity prices while underlying inflation has been relatively modest. It is this rate of 
change to electricity prices that has been focused on in public policy debates and 
the popular media.
A simple, but incorrect, conclusion from Figure 3 would be to state that energy 
affordability is a significant issue. Recent data from the ABS household expen-
diture survey clearly underscores the notion analysed in Simshauser, Nelson and 
Doan (2011a, p.88) – that “for the majority of society, even a doubling of energy 
cost will be little more than a household budgeting inconvenience”. While real 
electricity prices are now at their highest levels in decades, income growth and 
relatively flat average household consumption have acted to reduce the impact on 
consumers as a proportion of total energy bills relative to household disposable 
income. The most recent ABS Household Survey revealed that energy bills are no 
more significant now than in 2003-04 at the time of the last survey – around 2.6 
per cent of the average household budget. However, such analysis ignores the 
Figure 3  
CoNSUmER PRiCE iNDEx AND ElECTRiCiTy PRiCE iNDEx (yEAR oN yEAR ChANgE)
Source: ABS
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fact that individual households have significantly different incomes and consump-
tion. It is this variability that leads to significantly different outcomes for different 
segments of electricity consumers. 
Figure 4 shows the variability in consumption (measured as the absolute variation 
from the mean household spend on energy) for different electricity consumer seg-
ments in 2011–12. There are two very clear conclusions that can be drawn from 
this chart:
Households in the family formation demographic (principal electricity account •	
holder is aged between 35 and 55) consume significantly more electricity than 
the average; and 
All other demographic groupings (where the principal electricity account holder •	
is aged less than 35 or greater than 55) consume significantly less electricity 
than the average.
Few participants in economic and social policy debates would be surprised by 
these results. Households with greater numbers of people in the home (family 
formation) consume greater quantities of energy and young families generally 
have “uncontrollable consumers” in the form of children. Based upon this analysis 
and all other things being equal, households in the family formation demographic 
grouping are likely to be at greater risk of energy related financial hardship because 
of their greater consumption relative to other types of households. However, as 
Figure 4 
AbSolUTE vARiATioN iN hoUSEholD ENERgy CoSTS
Source: AGL, ABS, KPMG Demographics
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Figure 5 
AvERAgE hoUSEholD SizE AND AvERAgE hoUSEholD iNComE PER PERSoN
Source: AGL, ABS, KPMG Demographics
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indicated earlier an equally important variable in defining customer vulnerability to 
financial hardship is the income per person within a household. This is shown in 
Figure 5. 
Figure 5 shows the average household size and median weekly income per person 
per household across the same demographic age groupings used in Figure 4. 
Again, there are two key conclusions that can be drawn from the research. Firstly, 
the average household size is greatest when the principal account holder is in the 
age bracket 30 to 55. This is not controversial given the need for space heating 
and cooling with young children and the proliferation of energy zapping appliances 
and information technology generally. Secondly, the median weekly income per 
person per household is lowest for the same age demographic – family formation. 
In other words, households where the principal electricity account holder is likely 
to have a dependant family have lower household income per person than other 
households. This is a function of the likelihood of non-income producing depen-
dants (for example, children and a stay at home parent). 
When combined, the evidence outlined in Figure 4 and Figure 5 presents a dis-
turbing picture. At the stage of life when income per person is lowest, spending 
on energy is highest. The family formation demographic cohort are evidently 
proportionately, the group of households most likely to be at risk of hardship. 
Simshauser and Nelson (2012) presented evidence that about one in four 
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households in the family formation demographic cohort currently show some sign 
of energy vulnerability (for example inability to pay a bill on time, failure to pay a 
bill or disconnection). Figure 6 shows that the end result of higher than average 
consumption and lower than average household income per person, is over-rep-
resentation of the family formation demographic in groupings of customers in, or 
at risk of, hardship. Therefore, a key question that must be focused on by policy 
makers in an environment of rising electricity prices is the extent to which current 
frameworks for electricity related transfer payments and concessions are targeted 
at the demographic most at risk of hardship.
Table 2 shows the electricity concessions available to households in the mainland 
NEM states. It is clear from Table 2 that in all states except Victoria, concessions 
are paid as a lump sum irrespective of consumption. This is a poor public policy 
outcome. Energy vulnerability and financial hardship is a function of both house-
hold income per person and the total expenditure on electricity consumption. 
Given the significant variability in average household income outlined previously, 
it would be prudent for policy makers to commission an urgent review of electric-
ity concessions frameworks to determine whether adopting the Victorian model 
(where concession vary as a function of consumption) is a more effective way of 
addressing rising electricity bills and customer hardship.
Figure 6 
CUSTomERS iN hARDShiP
Source: The energy market death spiral – rethinking customer hardship, Paul Simshauser and Tim Nelson, AGL Applied Economic and Policy 
Working Paper Series, Working Paper No. 31, AGL Energy, Brisbane
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Table 2 
STATE bASED ENERgy (ElECTRiCiTy AND gAS) CoNCESSioNS
State Summary of standard energy concessions (2011)
Victoria Annual electricity concession: 17.5 per cent off consumption and service 
charges
Winter energy concession: 17.5 per cent off consumption and service charge
Off-peak concession: 13 per cent off the off-peak usage
New South Wales Low income household rebate: $200 annual rebate
Queensland Electricity rebate: $0.5740 per day ($209.51)
Reticulated natural gas rebate: $0.1579 per day ($57.63)
South Australia SA energy rebate: $158 annual rebate
Source: State governments
Another key issue in relation to the provision of energy concessions relates to 
eligibility criteria. The eligibility criteria outlined in Table 2 varies. In most states, 
eligibility is defined as being in possession of a Centrelink Healthcare card, a 
Centrelink pensioner card or a Department of Veteran Affairs (pensioner or war 
widow) card. These cards are not specific to any particular age group, but are 
reflective of providing assistance to particular groups in the community who are 
presumably in hardship or vulnerable in broader terms. Even more problematic 
is that some existing concessions are provided irrespective of whether hardship 
is likely to be an issue. For example, in Queensland, rebates are provided to all 
holders of Queensland Government Seniors Cards. While significant resources 
have been set aside to compensate households for increases in the cost of living 
associated with the introduction of a carbon price in 2012, there has been no 
comprehensive national or sub-national response to the issue of customer hard-
ship in relation to energy supply. 
Existing eligibility criteria may well have been effective in preventing customer 
hardship in some demographic groupings. In fact, existing criteria may be the 
reason that the groups of people over 55 and under 35 are underrepresented in 
the indicators of hardship presented in Figure 2. However, there is no eligibility cri-
teria designed to identify hardship within the family formation demographic and it 
is this demographic grouping which has above average consumption and below 
average household income per person. We consider this to be a “yawning gap” in 
energy policy hardship frameworks. 
Recommendation 4
Customer hardship should not be used as a reason to avoid completing the •	
energy market review process. Smart meters and dynamic pricing are neces-
sary reforms to increase economic productivity within the energy sector and the 
broader economy. However, it is clear that there needs to be a comprehensive 
national review of concession frameworks with a view to better aligning conces-
sion and transfer payments with customers in need (i.e. payments based on 
household income and consumption rather than one or the other).
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Energy in a greenhouse gas constrained 
environment
The Australian electricity sector will need to adjust to unprecedented changes in 
the relative cost of electricity generation technologies as innovation, movement in 
the fuel price, and climate change policies take effect. Modelling by the Federal 
Government suggests that renewable technologies could grow from less than 
10 per cent market share to be the dominant source of energy by 2050.7 For 
such a transformation to be at all feasible requires a robust basis for public policy 
decisions that can guide the investment and research decisions required to meet 
Australia’s long term emissions reduction targets. 
Decisions in the energy sector involve substantial capital investments and are 
for long time periods. Australia cannot afford the boom and bust cycle that has 
dominated renewable energy industries, nor for the level of policy uncertainty that 
typified energy debate for almost a decade, to continue8. Effective climate change 
mitigation is of such a long timeframe and represents such a transformation of the 
energy sector, that it demands a more rigorous assessment of the issues than 
what is frequently evidenced in political decisions. 
Quantifying uncertainty and guiding policy decisions
The core challenge for setting robust climate change policy is determining the 
merit of different choices given the magnitude of uncertainty that needs to be 
dealt with. Quantifying the uncertainty of technological innovation, future green-
house gas emission costs and capital and operating costs over time allows for 
the comparison of alternative policies to encourage the deployment of low carbon 
technologies. 
The basis of quantifying uncertainty involves viewing low carbon technologies 
as representing a call option for Australia whereby the nation has the option to 
deploy them in the future if feasible.9 Owning a call option gives someone the 
right, but not the obligation, to purchase something in the future. Australia has 
the right to deploy more low carbon emission technology in the future if the lev-
elised cost of low carbon emission technology is less than a similar assessment 
of a conventional existing technology with the cost of greenhouse gas emissions 
internalised. 
The value of the low carbon emission technologies for Australia can be estimated 
by:
Examining the estimate of the future cost of energy from different technologies; •	
and
Assigning probabilities to these forecasts. •	
When combined with a projection of the cost of carbon, this approach allows 
the value of various technologies to be quantified under different scenarios for 
technological progress. While these projections are complicated, the Australian 
Energy Technology Assessment (AETA) represents the best available current cost 
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estimates for a number of energy generation technologies to 2050 and highlights 
how rapidly expected costs can change. Comparing the AETA projections with an 
earlier forecast of energy expectations conducted by the Electric Power Research 
Institute (EPRI) highlights how estimates of different technologies can change 
rapidly due to global innovation or to the technical challenges associated with 
accessing various forms of energy. For instance, solar photovoltaic renewable 
technology is now expected to have one of the lowest levelised costs of electricity 
by 2030 due to technological advances and the expansion of global manufactur-
ing capacity. 
Assigning probabilities to the process of innovation and the technological break-
throughs necessary to reduce the costs of low carbon technologies is the next 
stage of quantifying the future value of a technology. While any forecast is limited 
in its accuracy, making assumptions explicit ensures a common basis for com-
parison between anticipated technological advances and provides an ability to 
compare public policy options. An Australian Academy of Technological Sciences 
and Engineering (ATSE) study used a Monte Carlo method to create a distribution 
of investment profiles for Australia’s portfolio of low carbon emission technologies 
based on the EPRI technology cost estimates.10 
Assigning a probability distribution to anticipated technological advances is an 
important step in evaluating where Australia should spend funds to encourage 
the deployment of low carbon emission technologies. While recognising Australia 
is predominately a technology taker, there is scope to enhance research and 
development and value in having a focus on the innovations that will make a tech-
nology commercially viable. 
Figure 7 
lEvEliSED CoST of ElECTRiTy (lCoE) iN 2030
Source: Electric Power Research Institute 2010 and Australian Energy Technology Assessment 2012
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Consider the case of solar thermal central towers which, if a range of technologi-
cal breakthroughs identified in the Scandia Laboratories roadmap occur, will see 
the levelised costs of electricity shift significantly from approximately $200–$250/
MWh to $80/MWh by 2020.11 The technological advances required to achieve 
those cost reductions include: 
Improving high temperature molten salt storage; •	
Reducing the parasitic power load; and•	
Reducing capital expenditure and operations and maintenance costs. •	
The technological advances identified in the roadmap essentially shift the antici-
pated probabilistic distribution from that described in the initial ATSE report to 
another more positive one, as described below. If or when the required techno-
logical advances occur, the overall value of that technological option increases 
until such a time as it represents a positive investment for the nation. 
The merit of the ATSE approach is that if the net present value (NPV) distribution 
is positive at any stage there is the potential it will create wealth in the future and 
so can justify taking action now to capture that wealth. For example, action may 
take the form of reserving land for future generating capacity. Since such an initial 
action can be undertaken with less expense than the widespread deployment 
of the technology, it may create value by making the technology available in the 
future. 
Nuclear power provides a very effective case study as the ATSE study concluded 
that it had one of the highest net present values of all technologies. CEDA’s 
research has found that nuclear power may not be commercially viable at this 
point for Australia. However, technological innovation being explored, particularly 
in the form of small modular reactors, has the potential to change that signifi-
cantly.12 This is why CEDA has recommended that Australia “purchase” a call 
option on the right to deploy nuclear power by developing a suitable regulatory 
framework and building domestic skills now. 
Figure 8 
STyliSTiC PRobAbiliTy DiSTRibUTioN of NET PRESENT vAlUE foR SolAR ThERmAl 
ToWERS
Source: Adapted from Burgess 2012 CEDA Australia’s Energy Options: Renewables and efficiency. 
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Figure 9 
NET PRESENT oPTioN vAlUES (NPov) foR DiffERENT NEW ElECTRiCiTy gENERATiNg 
TEChNologiES foR iNvESTmENT NoRmAliSED by DiviDiNg NPov by ThE PRESENT 
vAlUE of ThE CAPiTAl ExPENDiTURE, Pv(x)
Source: With permission, Australian Academy of Technological Science and Engineering (ATSE), Low Carbon Energy: Evaluation of new 
energy technology choices for electrical power generation in Australia, December 2010, pp22. 
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Focusing climate change policy
A key failing of technology neutral government policies is they have focused on 
facilitating the deployment of technology that is currently deployable rather than 
on maximising the long term capacity to deploy low carbon emission technology. 
For instance, the Clean Energy Finance Corporation (CEFC) was established with 
$10 billion to “overcome capital market barriers that hinder the financing, com-
mercialisation and deployment of renewable energy, energy efficiency and low 
emissions technologies”.13 The explicit intent to enable the deployment of renew-
able energy may result in Australia creating a more expensive energy generation 
mix in the long term than is optimal. 
The introduction of the emissions trading scheme provides an opportunity to 
refocus the objectives of proposed new climate change policies.14 Any new addi-
tional support for low carbon technologies should be based on the value of the 
call option they represent. Essentially, this represents a shift from encouraging 
deployment to encouraging the potential for deployment. For the CEFC this will 
involve using the insights of the options analysis to spend funds addressing the 
discrete barriers to renewables being deployed. Key examples of ways in which 
the potential for low carbon emissions can be encouraged include: 
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Focusing research and development on enabling technology breakthroughs, •	
such as what would be required for geothermal power to be commercially 
viable; 
Developing robust regulatory regimes for all energy sources prior to their •	
deployment, including nuclear power;
Working to ensure a social licence to operate exists for all energy sources, •	
including nuclear power, wind generation and coal seam gas extraction; 
Integrating low carbon emission energy sources with the transmission and dis-•	
tribution system; and
Developing domestic skills in implementing the initial investments in emerging •	
technologies. 
This approach would not be technologically neutral. Instead it would focus on 
trying to capture as much of the potential positive net present value of each low 
carbon technology. While this may result in greenhouse gas emissions being mar-
ginally higher in the short term, Australia would be spending funds to maximise 
their long term reduction. 
Recommendation 5
That any new additional support for low carbon technologies should be based •	
on the value of the call option they represent for Australia. Essentially, this rep-
resents a shift in new policies from encouraging deployment to encouraging 
the potential for deployment.
Harnessing the benefits of reform
The reform agenda initiated in the 1990s was predominately based on structural 
changes to the supply side of the electricity industry. Formerly state owned elec-
tricity commissions were disaggregated (and in some cases privatised). Excess 
generation capacity that was built up prior to the reforms was better utilised with 
net reductions in unit pricing and better outcomes for consumers. Due to the 
apparent obvious nature of the benefits of supply-side reform, it would appear 
that the appetite to complete the process by removing constraints in relation to 
demand-side response dissipated. 
It is in this context that many of the reforms identified in this paper are not new. 
In fact the 2002 Parer Review stated that: “All states and territories should enable 
customer choice of energy supplier, work towards removing retail price caps and 
mandate the installation of interval (or smart) meters.” This recommendation was 
made at a time of real declines in electricity prices. Accordingly, it is understand-
able that complex reforms such as these remained unimplemented given the 
absence of pricing pressures at the time.
The environment of today is very different. Electricity prices have increased sub-
stantially since 2008 due to a range of factors: spending on electricity networks; 
poorly coordinated and overlapping renewable energy policy; and a decline in the 
utilisation of electricity infrastructure. What is unambiguously clear is that reforms 
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to the supply-side of the market are unlikely to produce significant and ongoing 
benefits as these have largely been exhausted through the creation of the NEM. 
If rising electricity prices are to be addressed, the common thread related to 
underlying cost pressures must be considered – greater consumer choice and 
engagement.
The large capital expenditure programs of distribution businesses in some areas 
of Australia since 2008 cannot be undone. Infrastructure has been constructed 
and will be on the ground now for several decades. Like the supply-side reforms 
of the 1990s, Australia has a significant opportunity to make the best of a bad 
situation and introduce reforms which better utilise this infrastructure. Better utili-
sation of the existing capital stock will result in lower unit pricing for all customers. 
Such an outcome would be undoubtedly in the national interest. 
The reform agenda: 
To address the peak in energy demand: 
The regulatory framework for electricity metering should be amended to intro-•	
duce competition for metering services, promoting faster adoption of new 
smart metering technology;
Electricity prices should be deregulated and allow for ToU pricing at both the •	
network and retail level (this pricing already effectively exists at the wholesale 
level through the operation of the NEM); and
Governments and industry should develop together a comprehensive educa-•	
tion campaign for electricity consumers aimed at providing information about 
why electricity prices are rising and why reducing peak demand is in every cus-
tomer’s interests.
To empower consumers: 
A mechanism for consumers to effectively participate in electricity markets via •	
negotiated settlements be explored; and
In the longer term, the enabling regulatory and technological changes to facili-•	
tate an energy services model should be examined. 
To improve assistance to customers experiencing energy hardship: 
Undertake a comprehensive national review of concession frameworks with the •	
objective of better aligning concession and transfer payments with the require-
ments of customers in need (for example payments based on household income 
and consumption rather than one or the other).
To effectively address climate change: 
Ensure any new additional support for low carbon technologies should be •	
based on the value of the call option they represent for Australia. Essentially, this 
represents a shift in new policies from encouraging deployment to encouraging 
the potential for deployment.
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Appendix 1: Reforming network service provision
While energy prices have risen between 70 and 100 per cent in different parts of 
the NEM since 2007, a major portion of these price rises are not a consequence 
of economic forces or unique geographic characteristics. Rather, the ownership 
and regulatory structure of network service providers (NSPs) that are unique to the 
NEM provide a compelling case for reform. Addressing the causes of Australia’s 
internationally unusual growth in energy prices could reverse the trend while failing 
to do so will guarantee escalating energy prices.15 
When energy reforms were introduced in the mid-1990s, it resulted in what were 
previously vertically integrated state government owned electricity commissions 
being broken into generation, distribution and retail components. The reform 
was motivated by evidence that the industry was inefficient, and that through the 
introduction of competition wherever possible, costs would reduce and services 
improve. Competition was introduced into elements of the system, particularly 
in retail and generation. In contrast, the costs of the natural monopoly NSPs, 
the transmission and distribution services, are determined by regulation that 
attempted to replicate the incentives of competition. 
Apart from in Victoria, it has not succeeded. 
The outcomes in the generation market have been broadly positive. The risks 
associated with the development and operation of generators now reside with 
competing producers, rather than consumers. Supplies have been reliable and 
average prices are lower than when the reforms were adopted. In contrast, 
consumers bear the investment and price risks for NSPs. The distribution and 
transmission costs are now beginning to dominate energy price changes as they 
represent almost 65 per cent of revenue in the energy sector. The annual price 
increase for distribution businesses has been around 14 per cent and almost 
12 per cent for transmission networks from 2005 to 2011. In contrast, the annual 
price change for generation businesses declined by more than one per cent over 
the same period. 
The revenue growth has been driven by increases in the regulated asset base of 
the network service providers as their operating expenses have been relatively 
stable. The Australia Energy Regulator (AER) determines the size of the regula-
tory asset base, and its remuneration, by making five year determinations on the 
infrastructure required to meet forecast demand. It also makes a determination 
about the overall price, or revenue for some activities, based on the operating 
expenditure, depreciation on regulated assets and allows for a return on regulated 
assets. 
The level of capital expenditure in Australia by some NSPs in the NEM is interna-
tionally exceptional. For instance, the allowed capital expenditure in NSW in the 
current regulatory period is approximately six times higher per connection than the 
amount allowed in Great Britain,16 while in 2011 the total allowed capital expen-
diture on transmission and distribution per MWh produced is more than seven 
times higher in the NEM than in North America.17 It is unsurprising that Australia’s 
energy prices have begun to diverge from those experienced internationally. 
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Figure 10 
REgUlATED REvENUE of TRANSmiSSioN SERviCE PRoviDERS PER mWh 
TRANSmiTTED (2011$/mWh)
Source: Mountain 2012
Figure 11  
DiSTRibUTioN SERviCE PRoviDERS PER CoNNECTioN (2010$/CoNNECTioN) 
Source: Mountain 201118 
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Without significant reform, Australia will experience continuing energy price esca-
lation as transmission service providers and distribution service providers add 
considerable capital stock to their regulated asset bases. 
A frequent explanation for the capital deployed in Australia is the geographic 
features of the nation. While the NEM energy distribution networks are long per 
customer connection, it is not the cause of Australia’s much higher investment in 
the regulated asset base. The population of the NEM is highly urbanised and, with 
the exception of Tasmania, have energy generation sources close to the main 
load centres. Also, much of the network involves relatively inexpensive infrastruc-
ture servicing a few isolated rural users. While this use adds to length, it does 
not make a difference to total cost. Finally, Australia’s overall network constitutes 
relatively inexpensive overhead lines, 86 per cent, compared with 40 per cent of 
overhead powerlines in the UK. 
Network planning standards were made more stringent in NSW and Queensland 
from around 2005 and this is a commonly cited explanation of the increasing 
expenditure on capital. However, it is not clear that this has been the primary 
cause of growth in the regulated asset bases of NSPs in these jurisdictions. It 
is important to note that there was no meaningful attempt to assess end user 
preferences and whether they were willing to pay more when the standards were 
changed. 
Another major justification for investment in the network has been to address 
rising peak demand. However, analysis of the demand-related expenditure to the 
growth in peak demand of different service providers highlights a considerable 
variation in the cost of doing so. The charts below show that government owned 
service providers in NSW, Queensland and Tasmania have incurred significantly 
more expenditure to meet rising demand, than the privately owned service provid-
ers, particularly in Victoria, and the privately-owned service provider in SA. While 
it is obvious that excessive growth in peak demand and lower utilisation rates of 
the capital stock must be addressed, it is clear that ownership structures have a 
significant role in how organisations respond to it. 
Furthermore, there has been a long-standing over estimation of peak demand 
growth by NSPs (AEMO 2012). This has been particularly pronounced in NSW, 
Queensland and Tasmania and highlights the importance of effectively engaging 
consumers in pricing determinations. 
A far stronger explanation of the discrepancy in service costs of network service 
providers is their ownership structure. As Bruce Mountain states: 
“ The main reasons for higher capex do not lie with external factors but rather 
they can be attributed to state ownership, and the adoption of a form of regu-
lation that has failed to provide incentives for government owned services to 
reduce expenditure.” 19 
When state governments operate energy businesses they receive extraordinary 
benefits from a number of sources. The first is through the constitutional right of 
state governments to claim the income tax associated with the delivery of energy 
services through publicly owned state enterprises, the income tax equivalents. If 
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Figure 12 
REgUlATED ASSET bASE of DiSTRibUTioN SERviCE PRoviDERS PER CoNNECTioN, 
AND by oWNERShiP (2010$/CoNNECTioN) 
Source: Mountain, B. R. (2011). Australia’s rising electricity prices and declining productivity: the contribution of its electricity distributors. A 
report commissioned by the Energy Users Association of Australia.
Figure 13  
REgUlATED ASSET bASE of DiSTRibUTioN SERviCE PRoviDERS by oWNERShiP 
(2010$/CoNNECTioN)
Source: Mountain, B.R, (2012). A comparison of outcomes delivered by electricity transmission network service providers in the National 
Electricity Market. A report commissioned by the Energy Users Association of Australia.
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the state government does not own the business, it is unable to claim any income 
tax collected on its revenues. 
The second source of gain for state governments occurs because they can raise 
capital at lower rates than the regulatory model assumes. The regulatory process 
establishes an overall cost for network service provision or an overall revenue. 
Both approaches use the cost of capital a private company would pay to generate 
a reasonable return on the investment in the regulated asset base. However, state 
governments raise debt at levels substantially lower than that of private sector 
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companies. For instance, for the NSW Government, the yield on 10-year bonds 
issued by the government is currently around four per cent. Yet the regulatory 
controls currently in place allow network service providers to charge their custom-
ers as if interest rates were more than twice as high.20 The difference between the 
two interest rates is returned to state governments via either “competitive neutral-
ity” or “debt guarantee” fees. 
Figure 14  
REgUlATED ASSET bASE (RAb) of DiSTRibUTioN SERviCE PRoviDERS PER 
CoNNECTioN by oWNERShiP (2010$/CoNNECTioN) 
Source: Mountain, B. R. (2011). Australia’s Rising Electricity Prices and Declining Productivity: The contribution of its electricity distributors. 
A report commissioned by the Energy Users Association of Australia.
Figure 15 
ThE TREND gRoWTh iN RAb ComPARED To TREND gRoWTh iN PEAk DEmAND fRom 
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State governments also control the regulatory structure applied to NSPs. Unlike 
the generation market, the prices set in the transmission and distribution net-
works are not subject to competitive price pressure nor do the businesses bear 
the investment risk, the consequence has been systemic overestimation of energy 
demand.21
The benefits state governments derive from their ownership of the network service 
providers creates incentives for network service providers to “gold plate” their 
asset base. The NSW government receives $596 million in income tax equiva-
lents and competitive neutrality fees from its distribution and transmission service 
providers and retailers. These utilities also paid dividends of $575 million at the 
same time. 
When the 1990s’ reforms introduced regulatory structures for transmission and 
distribution networks, they were modelled on the relatively successful structure 
that had been developed in Great Britain for private companies and successfully 
adapted to Victoria. However, the growth in the regulated asset base of public 
companies clearly suggests that regulatory reform is required so that the owner-
ship of an organisation is recognised in the price setting process. As Mountain 
stated: 
“ The evidence of expenditure outcomes across all government owned network 
service providers and over long periods – at least three five year regulatory 
control periods – shows a consistent pattern of sharply rising capital expen-
diture.” 22 
The best solution is for state governments to divest their ownership of NSPs. 
However, if this is politically problematic then the regulatory arrangements should 
be adjusted to take account of government ownership. This would involve setting 
rates of return for state government owned service providers, and recognising 
their receipt of income taxes and competitive neutrality fees, in addition to their 
claim on attributable profits. 
Regulatory reform should include re-examining the existing five year price or 
revenue controls to government owned service providers. Errors in major param-
eters – such as demand forecasts and the cost of capital have been locked-in 
for five years as a result of this form of regulation. This has resulted in excessive 
over-investment, particularly by government owned NSPs. Making regulatory 
assessments over shorter periods will reduce the consequence of this. 
Greater use of benchmarking would also improve the regulatory framework. 
Prices, expenditures, asset values, service outcomes and rates of return should 
be benchmarked, and this information used to ensure that inefficient service 
providers are required to improve their efficiency in order to achieve comparable 
financial returns to those of their more efficient peers. The benchmarking should 
also include international comparisons in countries with comparable reliability 
standards.
The regulatory oversight of the energy sector should also be examined given 
the significant influence state government ownership has on the performance of 
network service providers. The case for politically-independent regulation of gov-
ernment owned network service providers is strong. 
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Recommendation 1
That state governments divest their ownership of network service provision •	
assets. 
If state governments do not privatise the provision of network services, then •	
the following should be undertaken: 
The ownership structure of NSPs is considered when determining a suitable  –
return on the regulated asset base; 
Reassess the timeframe over which regulatory price or revenue controls are  –
imposed; 
Expand the use of benchmarking for prices, expenditures, asset values,  –
service outcomes and rates of return to best domestic and comparable 
standards; and
Examine the regulatory oversight arrangements for jurisdictions where state  –
governments maintain ownership. 
Appendix 2: Description of the three previous 
energy policy perspectives
Australia’s Nuclear Options
Historically, nuclear power was not an option that needed to be considered due 
to Australia’s abundant and cheap alternative sources of energy. However, the 
need to address climate change has altered this historical trend. To not consider 
the nuclear option when trying to decarbonise the economy is tantamount to 
committing economic and environmental vandalism.
There is a substantial opportunity for Australia to play a more fundamental role 
in the global nuclear fuel cycle. Australia’s twin stabilities of political and geo-
graphic systems make it uniquely placed to hold nuclear waste material.23 The 
economic opportunity for Australia is to sell uranium, then be paid for its storage 
and, eventually, be able to sell today’s waste product as a fuel source for the next 
generation of reactors. This could be a lucrative industry built on world leading 
technology developed in Australia.
For Australia to capitalise on its nuclear potential, it first needs to address several 
hurdles to the development and deployment of nuclear power. These include the 
financial viability of nuclear power based upon current (Generation III+) technology, 
the lack of suitably qualified nuclear engineers and a lack of a social licence. The 
developments in small modular reactors (SMRs) may make nuclear fuel appropri-
ate for Australia’s energy needs while future generations of nuclear power reactors 
may provide sources of clean energy with high levels of safety.24 SMRs, unlike 
current technology, may prove to be financially viable in the Australian context.
There is little chance nuclear power will be accepted as a source of energy in a 
highly populated location without an established track record supplying energy to 
Australia. As a consequence, the most likely deployment option available would 
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involve SMRs displacing coal or diesel generation in remote parts of Australia. 
Once the Australian public has become comfortable with nuclear energy, and it 
has a proven safety track record, it will represent an option for greater deploy-
ment in the future. 
The following authors contributed to the policy perspective:
Professor Anthony Owen, Academic Director of UCL School of Energy and •	
Resources;
Professor Barry Brook, University of South Australia, Sir Hubert Wilkins Chair •	
of Climate Change; 
Dr Tom Quirk, who has spent 15 years as an experimental research physicist, •	
university lecturer and Oxford don; 
Tony Wood, Program Director, Energy, Grattan Institute; and•	
Tony Irwin, Chartered Engineer with 30 years’ experience commissioning and •	
operating nuclear reactors for British Energy in the UK.
Regardless of the eventual economics of SMRs, climate change is necessitating 
a reassessment of the deployment of nuclear power in Australia, the opportu-
nity cost of which is clear. Even without deployment innovations, nuclear power 
should be a part of Australia’s portfolio of policy responses to climate change. 
Two key steps to enabling nuclear power deployment involve: 
Establishing a national regulatory regime to oversee and monitor any potential •	
deployment of nuclear power; and
Training nuclear engineers by establishing an equivalent of the previous School •	
for Nuclear Engineering or the Australian School of Nuclear Technology. 
Given the potential for commercial SMRs to be available in 2020, the Federal 
Government should undertake these two steps immediately. 
The costs of establishing a nuclear regulatory framework and developing suitably 
qualified technicians can be considered as the cost of purchasing a call option 
on greater flexibility for future energy supply. The value of any option is critically 
determined by the variability of the underlying asset. Given the uncertainty about 
the cost of decarbonised energy, purchasing a nuclear call option may prove to 
be an invaluable investment. 
Australia’s Energy Options: Renewables and efficiency
Renewable energies are forecast to grow at a rapid pace, with some technolo-
gies, such as wind, forecast to rise by more than 900 per cent from 2010 to 
2040.25 While the social cost of carbon is set to increase substantially over time,26 
it will continue to be an externality requiring government intervention to quantify. 
Any government initiative should have clear objectives that define what magni-
tude of carbon emissions are being mitigated both now and in the future, with 
explicit examination of underlying assumptions about technological progress and 
the future cost of carbon.
To move beyond ad hoc decision making requires a robust quantification of the 
probabilistic outcomes of a full suite of energy technologies. Such an approach 
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would model the net present value (NPV) of an investment in an energy genera-
tion technology under a range of scenarios such as various carbon price levels of 
technological development. 
Understanding the contours of investment risk around the deployment of low 
carbon emission technologies also allows the merit and effectiveness of various 
policy initiatives to be quantified. For instance, while the net present value (NPV) 
of solar thermal towers may not be positive at this point, analysis may suggest a 
range of policy options (for example funding research and development) that can 
be undertaken now to facilitate future deployment should technological advances 
occur. 
Developing the capacity to deploy low carbon emission technologies in the future 
can be considered as equivalent to the nation buying a call option, which is a right 
but not an obligation to purchase the underlying asset in the future, on this form of 
energy. Initial estimates would suggest that Australia has a portfolio of renewable 
energy call options worth approximately $12 billion. The anticipated social benefit 
of individual policy interventions can also be quantified. All government programs 
should be assessed to ensure they are returning an efficient amount of mitigation. 
Australia could delay the need to deploy more energy generation capacity by 
more effectively managing the peak period of energy demand. While residential 
consumers, who drive peak demand, only constitute 27 per cent of electricity use, 
there are no incentives for them to avoid using the peak.27 One way to address 
peak load growth would be to establish long term predictions for energy supply 
requirements for network distribution and transmission networks, and then invit-
ing energy service providers and demand side participation companies to engage 
in competitive bidding to address them.28 Further, adopting an energy services 
model, whereby customers pay for the service energy makes available rather than 
paying for the commodity of energy itself, could create substantive incentives for 
a wide range of participants to find innovative ways to achieve improved levels of 
energy efficiency. 
The following authors contributed to the policy perspective:
Professor Paul Hardisty, Global Director of Sustainability & EcoNomics™ for •	
WorleyParsons;
Tony Wood, Program Director, Energy, Grattan Institute; •	
Professor John Burgess, Australian Academy of Technological Sciences and •	
Engineering Fellow and Principal Niche Tasks; 
John Dashwood, Chairman of ExxonMobil Australia; and•	
Andrew Pickford, Managing Director, ISSA Indo-Pacific.•	
Australia’s Unconventional Energy Options
Unconventional energy resources such as shale and coal seam gas are now 
technologically feasible and economically viable thanks to ongoing innovation. 
As climate change mitigation continues to be a policy priority, secure, relatively 
cheap gas can act as an environmentally superior substitute as its carbon dioxide 
emissions in energy production are up to 45 per cent less than coal.29 
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Australia has also been identified as having the fifth largest potential shale gas 
reserves in the world. In Queensland alone, if the coal seam gas industry reaches 
its forecast potential, it will be responsible for more than 20,000 jobs, provide 
$243 billion in tax to the Australian Government and result in real incomes in 
Queensland rising by $28,300 per person over the period from 2015 to 2035.30 
In order for the full potential of Australia’s unconventional energy options to be 
realised, several issues must first be addressed. 
The issue of property rights over land use is creating conflict between farming 
communities and mining companies, holding back the coal seam gas industry 
from its full potential. While mining companies have very strong legal property 
rights over their ability to access and extract unconventional energy, the legal 
frameworks which grant these property rights have been developed for energy 
extraction predominately in remote areas with little interaction with the broader 
community. The existing regime is too complex and difficult to govern the interac-
tion between the two groups. 
The use and treatment of water by the mining industry represents a major source 
of community concern and is a critical challenge to the widespread acceptance 
of unconventional energy sources. To ensure economically efficient and sustain-
able unconventional energy extraction occurs, it is important that those who 
benefit from its extraction pay for all costs associated with the activity. There is 
also scope for industry to improve the quality of its activities to minimise disrup-
tion and environmental risks, while addressing community concerns. In the case 
of unconventional gas, adopting best practice has been estimated to be less than 
10 per cent of total costs.31
The regulatory framework in eastern Australia has been categorised by catch-up 
regulation and widespread community opposition to unconventional gas resource 
activities. Substantial community concern has been generated because of the 
perceived lack of effective regulation overseeing the development of unconven-
tional gas resources. Having a seamless regulatory framework could help reduce 
the administrative burden imposed on businesses operating in numerous states, 
while assisting in maintaining community confidence that the industry is regulated 
in a responsible and sustainable manner.
The following authors contributed to the policy perspective:
Professor Quentin Grafton, Executive Director and Chief Economist, Bureau of •	
Resources and Energy Economics (BREE), Department of Resources, Energy 
and Tourism;
Rebecca Nelson, Program Leader, Comparative Groundwater Law and Policy •	
Program, Stanford University;
Deb Kerr, Manager, Natural Resource Management, National Farmers’ •	
Federation;
Dr Tina Hunter, Fellow, TimFischer Centre for Global Trade and Finance, Bond •	
University; and
Professor Kenneth B Medlock III, Deputy Director, Energy Forum, James A •	
Baker III Institute for Public Policy, Rice University.
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